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Human Rights and Broken Cisterns: Counterpublic
Christianity and Rights-based Discourse in Contemporary
England
Méadhbh McIvor
University of Groningen, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Although human rights are often framed as the result of centuries of Western Christian
thought, many English evangelicals are wary of the U.K.’s recent embrace of rights-
based law. Yet this wariness does not preclude their use of human rights
instruments in the courts. Drawing upon fieldwork with Christian lobbyists and
lawyers in London, I argue that evangelical activists instrumentalise rights-based law
so as to undermine the universalist claims on which they rest. By constructing
themselves as a marginalised counterpublic whose rights are frequently ‘trumped’
by the competing claims of others, they hope to convince their fellow Britons that a
society built upon the logic of equal rights cannot hope to deliver the human
flourishing it promises. Given the salience of contemporary political conservatism, I
call for further ethnographic research into counterpublic movements, and offer my
interlocutors’ instrumentalisation of human rights as a critique of the inconsistencies
of secular law.
KEYWORDS Human rights; counterpublics; Christianity; law; abortion
Introduction: Polonius’ Poor Advice
Conway Hall, the headquarters of the U.K.’s oldest established freethought organis-
ation, might seem an unusual institution to host a speaker from Christian Concern, a
London-based lobby group with a ‘passion to see the United Kingdom return to the
Christian faith’.1 Nevertheless, it was to this bastion of secular humanism that I
accompanied Carrie, the Christian Concern events manager, one evening in September
2012. We had come to watch a debate in which Andrea Minichiello Williams, the
group’s founder and CEO, would discuss ‘Freedom of speech, anti-abortion protestors
and women: rights and limits’. The debate had been organised by the British Pregnancy
Advisory Service (BPAS), Britain’s largest abortion provider. It had proved
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exceptionally timely: while Andrea went over her notes, lawyers from the Christian
Legal Centre – Christian Concern’s sister organisation, which exists to ‘defend… indi-
viduals and churches who have suffered discrimination and challenges because of their
desire to live and work according to biblical beliefs’ – were polishing their arguments for
the following morning, when they would represent two such anti-abortion protestors in
criminal court. Andy Stephenson and Kathryn Sloane, members of pro-life group
Abort67, had been arrested under the Public Order Act for displaying graphic images
of aborted foetuses outside one of BPAS’ Brighton clinics. Their upcoming trial
threw into sharp relief the issues to be discussed, reminding the 300 person audience
that although this particular debate was academic, the growth of groups like Abort67
meant it was being played out up and down the country with increasing frequency.
Having arrived with plenty of time to spare, Carrie and I took a quick tour of the
venue. Conway Hall’s main auditorium resembles a cross between a small theatre
and an old-fashioned school assembly hall. Above the stage, topping its wooden
framing, is Polonius’ oft-quoted dictum: TO THINE OWN SELF BE TRUE. Carrie
wondered aloud about the quote. Having determined that it did not come from the
Bible, she announced it to be ‘a very humanist statement’. The problem with this,
she explained, was that it begged the question: ‘who are you?’ Extending her index
fingers and curling her middle, ring, and little fingers into her palms, she pointed
two finger guns at me. ‘A mass murderer can say they’re being true to themselves,
and then: bang bang!’
Carrie’s rejection of Polonius’ maxim indexes real concerns about the contested
nature of goodness, morality, and capital-T Truth. These concerns form the subject
of this article, which focuses on English evangelical activists’ responses to what they
see as the U.K.’s embrace of a ‘culture’ of rights (Cowan et al. 2002: 11). While
human rights are often theorised as rooted in a particularly ‘Western Christian’ under-
standing of the person (Little 2015: 2; cf. Asad 2000, 2003; Wolterstorff 2008; Sherwood
2012; Moyn 2015), this narrative is complicated by the frequent rejection of rights-based
logic among conservative Christians, who understand rights-based claims to rely on an
atomistic logic that elevates the fallen morality of created men and women over the lim-
itless wisdom of their Creator God. As such, the rise of rights language is thought to
pander to the worst excesses of those who would take Polonius at his word: it
encourages depraved humans to be ‘true’ to their fallen selves, permitting rather than
restricting sinful behaviour.
Despite these concerns, the Christian Legal Centre – which has litigated such high-
profile European Court of Human Rights cases as those of Gary McFarlane,2 a Christian
counsellor who was dismissed from his job after voicing concerns over his ability to
offer psychosexual therapy to same-sex couples, and Shirley Chaplin,3 a nurse who
was removed from clinical duties after refusing to take off a crucifix necklace deemed
to breach her uniform requirements – often couches its arguments in the language of
rights. In particular, they rely on Articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention (as
articulated in the U.K.’s Human Rights Act 1998), which protect the rights to
freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and expression.4 This is, in part, the result
of the British legal system’s ongoing transition from recognising negative civil liberties
324 M. MCIVOR
to enforcing positive human rights, thereby encouraging would-be litigators to frame
their claims in these terms (Hill et al. 2011; Sandberg 2011). As it was once put it to
me, ‘You can only operate with the laws that you’ve currently got.’ But the Christian
Legal Centre uses rights-based legislation even when alternative, and perhaps less
risky,5 legal strategies are available to them.6 This suggests that they pursue rights-
based claims for reasons that go beyond the necessity of operating within ‘the laws
that you’ve currently got’.
Drawing on 22 months of fieldwork split between Christian Concern/the Christian
Legal Centre7 and a conservative evangelical church in London,8 this article takes the
Centre’s human rights claims and rights-based discourse as its objects of ethnographic
enquiry. It argues that Christian activists continue to litigate their cases under human
rights law precisely because they want to point out the flaws they imagine a rights-based
system to embody. Despite viewing the human rights project’s high valuation of the
human as a secularised version of Christian thinking, my interlocutors find its
current expression in English law both undesirable and unworkable. Unlike Christian-
ity, which is thought to pursue the good of all, human rights are accused of prioritising
the individual’s desires over the building up of common values. In this way, English
evangelical activists echo the assessment of postliberal theologian Stanley Hauerwas
(1987: 238), who argued some years ago that ‘[c]ontemporary political theory has
tended to concentrate on the language of rights, not because we have a vision of the
good community, but because we do not’ (cf. MacIntyre 1981: 246; Brown 2004).
Thus, while advocates of inherent rights posit them as existing regardless of context –
suggesting that ‘a human rights violation anywhere is of the same epistemological order
and of the same moral, political, or legal significance as a human rights violation else-
where’ (Riles 2006: 54) –my interlocutors argue that the legal system’s embrace of rights
discourse has resulted in conservative Christians having their allegedly inviolable rights
‘trumped’ by the competing claims of others (cf. Stychin 2009; Clucas 2012; Bomhoff
2013). Focusing on two of the Centre’s cases, Johns v Derby City Council and R v Ste-
phenson & Sloane, this paper suggests that the Centre instrumentalises the language of
rights to establish conservative Christians as the members of a self-identified ‘counter-
public’, highlighting their subordinate status and marking themselves off from an alleg-
edly dominant political elite (Warner 2002: 119). This counterpublic discourse seeks to
awaken its hearers to the logical inconsistencies of a doctrine that posits people as the
bearers of universal rights while simultaneously restricting the freedoms of those who
disagree with what the Centre terms the ‘prevailing politically correct orthodoxy’ (Wil-
liams 2011).
Given the rise of comparative conservative counterpublics throughout Europe and
America (Hochschild 2016; Westermeyer 2016; Pedersen 2017), I contend that anthro-
pologists must critically engage with the principles and pragmatics behind those who
continue to be dismissed as anthropology’s ‘repugnant cultural others’ (Harding
1991). It is only by taking seriously the ontological assumptions and meaning-
making strategies of conservative counterpublics that we can began to understand
the appeal of these movements (Westermeyer 2016: 134). Contra those theorists who
frame the language of rights as a near inevitable tool of state violence (Asad 2003; cf.
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Sullivan 2005; Hurd 2015), I argue that the Christian Legal Centre provides evidence of
how rights language can be harnessed to challenge the state to confront its own incon-
sistencies (cf. Casanova 1994, 2006; Weizman 2016; Wenger 2017). A critique that relies
on the tools of the object under criticism, however, will always have complicated out-
comes. Drawing upon ethnographic evidence from feminist and queer counterpublics, I
reflect upon the uncertain impact of such a critique, and conclude that, from some
angles, it never quite manages to achieve exteriority to the legal framework it hopes
to undermine.
On Human Rights
Since the United Nations’ 1948 adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), rights-based discourse has acquired prominence as an ‘ethical lingua franca’
(Tasioulas 2007: 75), even approaching the title of ‘sole approved discourse of resist-
ance’ for marginalised groups (Rajagopal, quoted in Riles 2006: 56). Yet despite the
UDHR’s confident assertion that human rights are the ‘highest aspiration’ of the
people of the world, there is little philosophical or practical consensus as to the ultimate
foundations of international human rights law (MacIntyre 1981; Rorty 1982; Brown
2004; Freeman 2004: 376). One oft-voiced explanation for the historic emergence of
the belief that men (and, occasionally, women) are endowed with certain rights by
virtue of their humanity frames it as the fruit of centuries of ‘Western philosophical
and theological thought’, with an emphasis on Christian theology as a precursor to the-
ories of natural rights (Little 2015: 8). In the words of theologian Nicholas Wolterstorff
(1987: 221), modern notions of rights derive from the Bible’s ‘[d]eep and pervasive…
insistence that human beings occupy a special place among earthlings in God’s eye’, as
well as their resulting moral obligations to others made in God’s image (Pojman 1991;
Freeman 2004; Wolterstorff 2008; Little 2015; cf. Sharma 2006; Sherwood 2012).
While Wolterstorff (2008) is an advocate of what he calls ‘inherent rights’, his theo-
logically inclined understanding of their origin is not limited to those who embrace the
human rights project. Talal Asad’s (2000) critical take on liberal accounts of rights
argues that these ostensibly universal values have ‘specifically Christian roots’, emer-
ging, as they do, out of Latin Christendom’s understanding of natural law. If Asad
and Wolterstorff link Christian theology to the emergence of inherent rights as think-
able ideals, recent historical scholarship has shown a more pragmatic side to this
relationship. In their challenges to the ‘foundation myth’ of the post-war rights revolu-
tion, in which ‘the proximate origins’ of the Universal Declaration and European Con-
vention are to be found in collective disgust at the atrocities of the Holocaust (Duranti
2012: 159), Samuel Moyn (2010, 2015) and Marco Duranti (2012, 2017) suggest that the
codification of rights in law owes more to conservative Christian (and particularly
Catholic) anxieties surrounding secularism, socialism, and individualism than to an
international recognition of the horrors of genocide.9 Thomist philosopher Jacques
Maritain, for example, played a significant role in promoting universal rights as a
bulwark against atheistic Marxism (Moyn 2015: Chapter Two), while French Catholics
determined to ensure parental control over religious education advocated for the
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codification of human rights on this basis (Duranti 2017: Chapter Seven). These post-
war conservatives believed that a supranational European court was more likely to
promote ‘Christian values’ than secular national governments, with human rights the
vehicle through which they might ‘reconstitute a Christian Europe’ (Duranti 2017: 301).
These Christianising aspirations, however, did not come to pass. As Udi Greenberg
(2017: 184) notes, neither the European Convention nor its attendant court was able to
transform the legal order. Cognisant of its ‘flimsy legitimacy’, the European Court of
Human Rights often deferred to those it was supposed to police: ‘Everybody recognised
that “Europe” could not overturn the decisions of national parliaments, and the court
regularly parroted the words of nation states’ (Greenberg 2017; cf. Duranti 2017: 317).
The uneasy relationship between state power and international law is also high-
lighted by Asad. His genealogy posits that rights rely on a particular construction of
‘the human’ as sovereign and independent, possessing rights ‘independently of social
and political institutions’ (Asad 2003: 130). This interpretation suggests a duality in
which an individual can suffer both as a ‘national of a particular state’ and as a
‘human being’ (Asad 2003: 129). Paradoxically, human rights are concerned only
with the suffering of the abstract human being, yet rights-based law is meaningless
unless enforced by state actors on behalf of citizens. Invoking Hannah Arendt’s asser-
tion that human rights depend on national rights – when faced with stateless, perse-
cuted, victimised bodies, Arendt wrote, the world ‘found nothing sacred in the
abstract nakedness of being human’ (quoted Asad 2003: 143) – Asad argues that ‘sac-
redness in the modern secular state is attributed not to real living persons but precisely
to “the human” conceptualised abstractly, or imagined in a state of nature’. As such,
Asad wonders what kind of ‘justice’ human rights can achieve.
It is precisely this relationship between state-backed norms and human rights law
that my activist interlocutors find frustrating. They reject the association of justice
with the rule of law when that law, in their eyes, permits sinful behaviour in the
name of rights. Yet they also complicate the narrative that sees rights discourse as Chris-
tianity’s secular successor. By contrast to this genealogy, my interlocutors stress an
assumed distance between Christian Britain’s tradition of ‘tolerance’ and the contem-
porary application of human rights law. Although they willingly ascribed Christian
origins to both negative civil liberties and (certain understandings of) positive rights,
these were usually distinguished from Britain’s post-Human Rights Act ‘agenda’.
Andrea, for example, believes that civil liberties such as freedom of speech, worship,
and association are Christian in origin, and she associates the alleged dismantling of
Britain’s Christian framework with the corresponding erosion of these liberties. She
understands the European Convention to have been ‘infused’ with Christian values.
However, she also worries that the ‘Christian backdrop’, in her words, that lies
behind human rights’ ‘recognition of human dignity’ has been ‘hijacked by an equality
and diversity type approach’.
From Andrea’s perspective, this hijacking has undermined the law’s structural unity,
as the secularisation of contemporary rights discourse means that English courts do not
recognise the Bible as a higher power to which to appeal when applying the law
(Freeman 2004: 386–391; see McCrea 2010: 53–56, for an overview of EU Treaty
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drafters’ debates on whether or not to incorporate a reference to the Christian God into
the Treaty; and Morsink 1999: 281–290, for a similar account in relation to the UDHR).
Without access to God, a ‘God-substitute’ such as Reason or Nature (Freeman 1994:
498; Morsink 1999: 282), or a guiding principle to which to appeal in the case of con-
flicting rights, the pitting of one discrete right against another has led some conservative
Christians to associate human rights with an ‘anti-moral agenda’ (Carey 2011).
During a presentation at a conference called ‘Setting Love in Order: Protecting the
freedoms to believe, to exist and to change when homosexual feelings are unwanted’,
Andrea spoke of the ‘confusion of rights language’ that had resulted from this failure
to define and pursue the U.K.’s common good. The conference had been organised
by the Core Issues Trust, an ‘ex-gay’10 charity. Andrea was one of a number of speakers
invited to address the sixty or so delegates, a mix of conservative Christian activists,
therapists, liberal Christians opposed to ex-gay therapy, journalists and one Labour
politician. Her presentation focused on the potential consequences of the Counsellors
and Psychotherapists (Regulation) Bill, a Private Members’ Bill put forward by
Labour’s Geraint Davies, which sought to regulate the provision of psychotherapy
(and was generally understood as an attack on ex-gay ministries). Standing in the
Emmanuel Centre11 in a candyfloss pink suit and matching lipstick, Andrea combined
the passionate oratory of an evangelical preacher with the aesthetics of Jackie
O. Arguing that Britain’s constitutional freedoms, which she dated to the 1215
Magna Carta, were undone by laws such as that put forward by Mr Davies, she
continued:
Note that the Magna Carta is not really framed in the language of ‘rights’ … [A]nd human
rights, of course, are actually very confusing, because actually what we need as a society, and
what the Magna Carta set down in constitutional terms, was an idea of the common good, of
what is good, [which was] founded deeply in the precepts and the principles that are rooted
in the Bible, in Christianity.
The embrace of rights, she explained, had led to a situation where ‘there are competing
rights and no idea of what the common good is’, with Bible-believing Christians pun-
ished as a result.
Why, then, does the Christian Legal Centre continue to mount challenges framed in
the language of rights? Their complicated relationship with rights was summed up by
Andrew Marsh, the group’s campaign manager, at a presentation he gave at a Baptist
church in September 2012. His talk, titled ‘The Marginalisation of Christianity in
Britain Today’, focused on Britain’s recent departure, as he saw it, from Christian
values. After his presentation, the floor was opened up to questions or comments.
Most of those present appeared to be over the age of 60,12 and one of the first comments
came from a retired social worker. He told us that in the council where he had pre-
viously worked, a room had been made available for a Muslim colleague to pray in,
but no such concessions had been made for Christians. Andrew responded by
suggesting that this differential treatment was not uncommon. However, he then
stated that the decision to seek to enforce one’s rights in such a situation was
‘complex’. This was because Christians:
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Don’t want to be quick to assert our rights, because… it doesn’t tend to lead to a cohesive
society. But I think in some of these cases we need to recognise that and to highlight it,
because it shows really that the current approach isn’t working. It’s not even working on its
own terms, where it preaches fairness but actually doesn’t seem to reflect that in practice.
This answer draws attention to the instrumental potential of human rights law, not pri-
marily in terms of its ability to right a wrong or wring justice from inequity – to insist
upon the equal treatment of Christian and Muslim employees, for example – but to ﬂag
up injustice as evidence of the conceptual bankruptcy of a framework that ‘preaches
fairness but actually doesn’t seem to reﬂect that in practice’.
Andrew encouraged this small, aging pocket of the Kingdom to go against their
Christian disinclination to ‘cry discrimination’ by highlighting the benefit of using
rights-based language to reveal its own inconsistencies. Like Asad, he recognised that
human rights law can be deployed as part of the state’s attempt at civilising minority
groups, those who reject the norms of their (often colonial) state authorities. But by
contrast to Asad’s (2003: 158) account, which reifies rights as instruments of only
‘the most powerful nation-states’, Andrew suggested that rights discourse could be
used to reveal and challenge the fickle nature of those same state-backed socio-legal
norms. In the following section, we will examine two of the Centre’s cases as concrete
examples of this approach.
Rights and Rhetoric
Conway Hall fell silent as Andrea took to the lectern. Her presentation followed that of
Ann Furedi, BPAS’ chief executive, who had argued that although she found no words
to be ‘unsayable’ and no images ‘unshowable’, the right to freedom of speech was ‘not
some kind of charter that allows you to say anything you want, at any time you want, in
any place you want’. After thanking the debate organisers for her invitation to speak,
Andrea said:
I was… heartened when Ann Furedi said that nothing should be unsayable and no image
unshowable, because in a sense I wanted to go to the very heart of what has caused this
debate this evening… So, what are the abortion images that Abort67, that Kathryn Sloane
and Andy Stephenson, are showing? Let’s look at them now, shall we?
Andrea pressed play. Vague murmurings of disapproval – at Andrea from the pro-
choice side, at the act of abortion from the pro-life side – swept the room as a screen
mounted on the stage began to play a video of a surgical abortion to the 300 person
audience. The video clip, which lasted about a minute and a half, was bloody and
graphic. Footsteps at the back of the hall indicated someone leaving the room for its
duration. When the clip had ﬁnished, Andrea used the screen to show some of the
still images used by Andy and Kathryn in their anti-abortion protests, one of which
showed dismembered foetal remains, including a foot. Indicating the images, she con-
tinued: ‘Ann Furedi talks of the right of autonomy for the woman, of the right of choice.
But what about the right of that seven week embryo? The right of that little foot?’
ETHNOS 329
Andrea’s decision to spend a portion of her allocated speaking time standing in
silence while the audience watched the removal of a dismembered foetus from an anon-
ymous woman’s vagina proves a useful starting point for an exploration of the use of
rights-based language to undermine a rights-based framework. Of the four speakers
(two of whom were pro-choice and two of whom were pro-life), Andrea’s was the
only presentation later accused of deviating from the topic at hand; whatever her inten-
tions, her video was taken as an attempt to condemn abortion itself rather than a dis-
cussion of the ‘rights and limits’ of pro-life protestors (see the report by Guardian
journalist Sarah Ditum 2012). From Andrea’s perspective, however, she had shown
the video in an attempt to ‘bring integrity’ to a debate that, by focusing on the rights
of (born) women and ignoring those of (unborn) children, she felt to be ‘intellectually
dishonest’ (quoted in Ditum 2012).13
Similar accusations are implicit in many of the Centre’s legal arguments. Take, for
example, the case of Johns v Derby City Council, which came before the High Court
in November 2010.14 In 2007, Eunice and Owen Johns, Jamaican-born Derby residents
and members of the Church of the God of Prophecy, applied to Derbyshire Council for
approval as short-term foster carers, a position they had previously held without com-
plaint. In the intervening years, however, the regulations governing fostering had
changed. In accordance with the Council’s fostering guidelines, the application
process for prospective foster carers now required them to comment on their ability
to support a child who was unsure of her sexuality or identified as lesbian, gay, or bisex-
ual. According to the social worker who interviewed them, ‘both Eunice and Owen
expressed strong views on homosexuality, stating that it is “against God’s laws and
morals”’, and when asked how he would support a child who was lesbian or gay, Mr
Johns told the interviewer that he would ‘gently turn them round’.15
This left the Council staff in a bind. On the one hand, they felt unable to approve
foster carers whose views on homosexuality seemed to breach the requirements of
the National Minimum Standards for Fostering Services. On the other, they were
equally bound by the Equality Act 2006, which prohibits discrimination on religious
grounds. The application stalled, and the Johns, represented by the Christian Legal
Centre, instituted judicial review proceedings against the Council. As no decision had
actually been made on the Johns’ suitability as foster parents, both parties agreed to
make a joint application for declaratory relief, asking the High Court to provide an
answer to the following question:
How is the Local Authority as a Fostering Agency required to balance the obligations owed
under the Equality Act 2006 (not to directly or indirectly discriminate on the grounds of religion
or belief) [with] the obligations under the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007
(not to discriminate directly or indirectly based on sexual orientation) […]?16
The question’s reference to ‘[balancing obligations]’ reﬂected the by then well-estab-
lished trope that the duty not to discriminate on grounds of religion and the duty
not to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation were diametrically opposed. The
impact of the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 on adoption and fos-
tering agencies with a religious ethos had taken on an almost iconic status as an example
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of the tension produced by a system that sought to reconcile both the right to freedom
of religion and the right to non-discrimination, an issue deemed especially inﬂamma-
tory in relation to child welfare (Stychin 2009: 19). For many conservative commenta-
tors, particularly (but not exclusively) those who identiﬁed as Christian, the
requirement that homosexual and heterosexual couples be treated as legally equivalent
by religious adoption agencies and foster parents was understood as an example of reli-
gious rights being ‘trumped’ (Donald et al. 2012: 82–83), with the duty to ‘balance’ com-
peting rights seen as proof that the relationship between sexual orientation, religion,
and the law was actually in a state of imbalance (Stychin 2009: 34).
Indeed, the apparently irreconcilable conflict between these two competing rights
was stressed in the Centre’s submissions to the High Court. Paul Diamond, Standing
Counsel to the Christian Legal Centre, asserted that ‘[t]he advancement of same-sex
rights is beginning to be seen as a threat to religious liberty’.17 He argued that to prior-
itise the right to non-discrimination over the right to freedom of religion was to issue ‘a
blanket denial on all prospective Christian foster parents in the United Kingdom’.18
Drawing on the language of sexual minorities, Mr Diamond submitted that refusing
to recognise the validity of the Johns’ position would force Christians ‘into the
closet’.19 He was concerned not only to point out the conflict of rights that had been
codified by the various statutory instruments identifying both religion and sexual orien-
tation as protected characteristics, but to use this to paint Christians as a marginalised
group at risk of ‘second class’ citizen status.
The judges who heard the case, Lord Justice Munby and Mr Justice Bateson, were
unimpressed with what they later described as Mr Diamond’s ‘extravagant rhetoric’.20
Critiquing his submissions as a ‘travesty of the reality’,21 and claiming that parts of his
argument were simply ‘utterly unarguable’,22 they dismissed the question put before
them as too vague to answer. Their strongly worded judgment was interpreted as a
stinging rebuke to the parties involved, and, in particular, to Mr Diamond himself.
Nor were Justices Munby and Bateson alone in their opinion of the case. Legal com-
mentator Joshua Rozenberg (2011), for example, declared to readers of The Guardian
that Diamond’s performance proved the paradox that ‘it is never a good idea for an
advocate to be committed to his or her cause’, and suggested that Christian campaign
groups ‘should avoid using tendentious arguments in support of claims which are
unwinnable’. Even fellow Christians wondered what the Centre had hoped to
achieve. Despite sharing the Johns’ understanding of sexual ethics, a number of conser-
vative evangelical lawyers told me that taking the case had been strategically unwise,
while the cross-party group Christians in Parliament (2012: 45) criticised the
Centre’s reporting of the judgment as misleading: ‘The assumption of a martyr position
can appear laudable, but is often a lazy mode of public engagement.’ More unforgiving
still were liberal Christians, such as Anglican Bishop Alan Wilson (2011), who argued
that ‘the customary paranoia of rightwing newspaper op-eds sounds silly in court’.23
Yet in spite of these less than positive responses from the legal and religious estab-
lishment, there is a sense in which Johns ought to be seen as a Christian Legal Centre
success. Although the judges declined to rule on the Council’s non-decision and refused
to give leave to pursue judicial review, they did state that:
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While as between the protected rights concerning religion and sexual orientation there is no
hierarchy of rights, there may, as this case shows, be a tension between equality provisions con-
cerning religious discrimination and those concerning sexual orientation. Where this is so, Stan-
dard 7 of the National Minimum Standards for Fostering and the Statutory Guidance indicate
that it must be taken into account and in this limited sense the equality provisions concerning
sexual orientation should take precedence.
For those who had fought the case, this statement proved what they had been saying all
along: that in a rights-based society which protects conﬂicting rights, some rights would
take precedence over others. The Centre soon set about exposing what they regarded as
the intellectual dishonesty of a judgment which could deny the existence of a ‘hierarchy
of rights’ while simultaneously indicating that, in some cases at least, provisions relating
to sexuality ‘should take precedence’. In an opinion piece titled ‘Permanent Exclusion
and the Johns’ (Williams 2011), Andrea wrote:
I hope that the highlighting of the issue in the press will shatter the misconception that the
Equality Act means equality for all. Some are very much more equal than others. We are cur-
rently living in ‘Animal Farm’ days; ‘All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than
others’.
By pitting two protected rights against each other, the Centre had, one might argue,
called the human rights project’s bluff. Although no order had actually been made by
the court, they could present the judgment as evidence that the context-negation of
human rights advocates, in which all rights are innately held and of equal worth, was
mere – and perhaps even extravagant – rhetoric. Some rights would always prove
more violable than others. The only question was which value system would be used
to decide between them. As the article stated, ‘Judges and politicians want to restrict
participation in public life to those who subscribe to their values, yet their values
appear to be little more than whatever the prevailing politically correct orthodoxy is;
ﬂeeting, malleable and unsustainable’ (Williams 2011). Johns, then, was not a case
lost, but an argument vindicated.
Counterpublic Critique
In the Centre’s court submissions and Andrea’s article, conservative Christians are both
objectively presented as being and subjectively encouraged to identify as a maligned,
marginalised group. These references to perceived oppression ‘[provide] the impetus
for the development of a self-consciously oppositional identity’ in relation to what is
taken to be an otherwise marginalising public sphere (Felski 1989: 167), thereby indi-
cating one’s membership in a particular kind of public. Literary critic Michael
Warner (2002: 67) defines a ‘public’ as a social form brought into being through circu-
lating discourse, a conglomeration of strangers that exists ‘by virtue of being
addressed’.24 The ideology of the bourgeois public sphere requires this address to be
grounded in ‘rational-critical’ discourse, the disembodied reason of anonymous
written texts and their unknown audience of readers. In this imagining, ‘[t]he public
is thought… to require persuasion rather than poesis’ (Warner 2002: 115). Some
publics, however, are defined through their opposition to the ideological dominance
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of discourse that presents itself as representing the public. These counterpublics are con-
stituted not only through rational-critical dialogue, but through alternative forms of
address and engagement, such as the passionate and emotionally stimulating Quranic
language of Egyptian reformist preachers (Hirschkind 2006: 122) or the critique of het-
eronormativity offered by the comportment of lesbians and gay men (Warner 2002: 51–
52). It is such a counterpublic that the legal arguments and opinion pieces cited above
invoke, constituting, as they do, a form of discourse in which conservative Christians
are understood to be defined by their marginal relationship to the dominant public
sphere.
Indeed, in Diamond’s analysis, Christians are more than simply marginal. They are
victims of an intolerant and ethically bankrupt state which seeks to ‘use its coercive
powers to de-legitimise Christian belief’.25 In his portrayal, Christians are excluded
from civil life on the grounds that they lack ‘the same degree of moral accountability
as other members of society’ (Honneth 1992: 191): they are ‘second class’ citizens,
unfit to foster vulnerable children. As we have already seen, these assertions were dis-
missed by the High Court as unable to satisfy the evidentiary requirements of the law.
But by rejecting the norms of dominant public discourse, opting instead to express
themselves in forms alien to the preferred rational-critical language of the public
sphere in general and the legal system in particular – submitting, instead, claims
couched in ‘extravagant rhetoric’, emotionally arresting videos and images, and
legally inadmissible assertions such as ‘I believe’ (Rozenberg 2011) – the textual and
photographic record of the Centre’s cases and public pronouncements form a narrative
that simultaneously draws upon and brings into being their counterpublic status. That
this discourse is excluded from the court sheds light on the ideology of a legal system
that defines religious ‘passion’ as ‘inimical to reason’, thereby subjecting it to restraint
by secular authorities (Asad 2003: 67). Cases like Johns reveal that in law, as in religion,
‘the demand for evidence can be the prerogative of power’ (Keane 2008: 116), with
certain kinds of proofs and truth claims – and particularly those couched in the
words ‘I believe’ – quite literally ruled out of court (Sullivan 2005).
As Emma Tarlo’s (2010: 127) discussion of the use of human rights law by the Isla-
mist organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir shows, conservative Christians are not unique in using
the law towards ends with which its drafters might disagree. Nor are they alone in
seeking to use the weight of the law against itself. Elian Weizman (2016), for
example, has recently argued that Palestinian legal activists use Israel’s Basic Law to
unmask the oppressive nature of the Israeli state.26 These cause lawyers use the court
system to show that although the constitution guarantees the equality of all citizens,
justice is always framed ‘ethnically’, with Palestinian citizens of Israel routinely
denied their rights (Weizman 2016: 47). It is worth noting, however, that although
these actors seek to use extant law to reveal its own inconsistencies, they are careful
to do so within the limits of legal convention: they ‘follow strictly legal argumentation
… [Accepting that the] legal field has established conventions that must be adhered to
by those who choose to enter it’ (Weizman 2016: 49). While Weizman’s interlocutors
use the courts to frame Palestinians as full (albeit unrecognised) citizens who ought
to be included in the state’s distribution of rights and privileges, my interlocutors use
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the courts to conceptually exclude themselves from the dominant public, instead embra-
cing a counterpublic identity.
To be sure, to be a member of a conservative Christian counterpublic in twenty-first
century Britain is to adopt a subaltern identification by choice, at least in part.27 Yet the
Centre’s counterpublic discourse is more than just ‘the expression of subaltern culture’
(Warner 2002: 121). This is because, as with any public discourse, counterpublic speech
requires the speaker to open their words up to ‘indefinite others’ (Warner 2002; cf.
Felski 1989: 168; Fraser 1995: 293). It is precisely by speaking into this space of
unknown discursive circulation that Christian activists hope to convince wider
society of the validity of their understanding of the good, even as they simultaneously
construct themselves as a marginalised group that exists in opposition to this wider
society.
Can we conclude, then, that the Centre makes what Rozenberg calls ‘tendentious
arguments’ while pursuing ‘unwinnable’ claims because it actually hopes to lose these
cases, thereby vindicating its narrative of marginalisation? Such an analysis is, I
believe, unsatisfactory. Although they often anticipate loss in the courts, and although
they view success primarily in terms of pleasing God, Christian legal activists firmly
believe in both the moral and legal force of their arguments. That God’s economy
trumps a judge’s ruling does not mean that this ruling is unimportant (see McIvor
2016). Wins are celebrated and losses mourned, not only because they have a real
impact on clients whom the staff has come to know and respect but because they rep-
resent months of hard work and fervent prayer. As such, it would be misleading to
suggest that rights-based cases are taken with loss as their goal.
But although it would be inaccurate to say that the Centre takes its cases with the
intention of losing them, there is a benefit to these losses, as they allow both staff
and supporters to argue that the current approach to rights does not work ‘on its
own terms’. It is hoped that publicising this through the legal system will achieve
three interlocking aims. First, it reveals the intellectual dishonesty of the rights-based
system and its lack of foundation or guiding principle. Second, it gives non-Christians
a chance to hear a Christian alternative to, for example, universalising understandings
of sexuality and gender. Third, it cultivates ‘indignation’ (Niezen 2010) and encourages
other conservative Christians to join efforts to put Christ at the heart of the nation. The
potential discomfort a client might feel when they ‘cry discrimination’ can be justified as
part of a broader strategy of opening up possibilities for the articulation of an evange-
lical alternative. As such, legal activism is part of a two-pronged reform strategy: first,
reveal the problems with the current system; second, offer a Christian solution.
Furthermore, the portrayal of conservative Christians as the members of a maligned
counterpublic means that the Centre’s staff and clients can present their cases as evi-
dence of the law’s failure to practice what it preaches even when the Centre’s clients
win, when an alternative reading would suggest that the law had ‘balanced’ potentially
conflicting rights in their favour (cf. Clucas 2012). It is in relation to this phenomenon
that we return to the case of Andy and Kathryn, the Abort67 members who had been
arrested under the Public Order Act for displaying graphic abortion images.28 Founded
in 2008, Abort67 is the brainchild of Andy Stephenson, a small, bespectacled man with
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dark, wispy hair and a permanent five o’clock shadow, who formed the group after
seeing pictures of aborted foetuses shortly after viewing ultrasound images of his
own unborn daughter. Abort67 is the U.K. branch of the Center for Bio-Ethical
Reform (CBR), a U.S.-based pro-life campaign group, from which they receive
advice, resources, and the graphic pictures used in their demonstrations. Named after
the Abortion Act 1967, which provides a defence, under certain conditions, to the
crime of procuring a miscarriage under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861,
Abort67 presents itself as a public education project that seeks to ‘expose’ abortion.
Andy believes that legislative change depends upon changing public opinion, and it
is for this reason that he displays his banner images, some of which are over eight
foot in length, outside abortion clinics, colleges, universities, and government buildings.
Anti-abortion sentiment has existed in the U.K. since the passing of the 1967 Act. By
the late 1990s, however, the existence of a largely pro-choice electorate meant that ethi-
cist and lawyer Sally Sheldon (1997: 2) could write that ‘those who continue to kick
against [the status quo] – be they pro- or anti-choice activists – are cast as marginal
extremists’, with attempts to export the more ‘violent’ tactics of American organisations
such as Operation Rescue deemed ‘largely unsuccessful’. By the time of Andy and
Kathryn’s trial, however, this account was somewhat out of date. Abort67’s confronta-
tional approach – the group prioritises ‘unborn lives’ over ‘born feelings’ – and explicit
link to the California-based CBR had led to its being associated with attempts to (re)po-
liticise the issue of abortion in a way reminiscent of America’s abortion ‘culture wars’
(see Ginsburg 1989), with increasingly polarised rhetoric mobilised by both pro-
choice and pro-life advocates as a result (as highlighted by the press: Quinn 2011;
Kinchen 2012). Andy and Kathryn’s arrests ought to be understood in light of this
increasing tension.
Their case was heard in one of Brighton Magistrates’ Court’s modest courtrooms.
Courtroom number two’s public gallery consists of two rows of wooden benches uphol-
stered in leather the colour of pea soup, the former occupants of which have scrawled
messages in the soft wooden railing separating the gallery from the courtroom proper.
Sitting amidst the ghosts of previous spectators – ‘Carina + Beth woz ere 03’, ‘Dawn
H. 21.9.91’ – I watched the Centre’s team use the language of rights to reinforce the con-
servative counterpublic in a different way than they had done in Johns. While Johns had
suggested that the right to freedom of religion was trumped by the rights of sexual min-
orities, this case argued that the right to free speech did not seem to apply to Christian
groups, with other organisations apparently given free rein to use graphic images in
their protests.
The assertion that Christians were treated less favourably than others was made par-
ticularly forcefully by Paul Diamond during his cross-examination of one of the arrest-
ing Police Constables (PCs), whom I will call PC Thompson. Diamond suggested that
PC Thompson had made the decision to remove the banner based not on the criteria of
the Public Order Act, which requires the expression under consideration to be insulting,
abusive, or threatening, and to have caused harassment, alarm, or distress as a result,
but on the basis of her own personal dislike of the image. There’s nothing more frigh-
tening, he told the judge, than the ‘personal predilection’ of a police officer arbitrarily
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determining the limits of free speech. Having apparently lost none of the rhetorical flair
he displayed in Johns, he suggested that she had acted as though she were in ‘Putin’s
Russia’. Were other campaign groups harassed in the way that Abort67 had been?, he
asked. Were the graphic images used by pro-Palestine campaigners subject to the same
level of scrutiny as the graphic images used by Abort67? Producing an A4 image of
the mutilated bodies of deceased Palestinian children, which had apparently been
used at an anti-Zionist rally, he placed the photograph into PC Thompson’s hands.
As she began to cry, the judge called a short recess.
Nor were photographs of these broken bodies the only images submitted as evidence.
Abort67 argued that their pictures were no more graphic than many of the images
exposed to the general public through newspapers, television, and government cam-
paigns. Indeed, Andy had compiled some of these graphic, bloody, and otherwise dis-
turbing images into a book, a copy of which was given to the judge. The defence went
through the images one by one: a front-page newspaper article about the death of
Muammar Gaddafi illustrated with a picture of his corpse; a Time magazine cover
depicting a woman whose nose and ears had been cut off by the Taliban; images of can-
cerous lungs and diseased hearts taken from government-sponsored anti-smoking cam-
paigns. These counterpublic submissions both challenged the otherwise staid discourse
of the court and confirmed Andy’s membership in a group that existed, at least partially,
outside of this normative order. Citing the graphic images used by evangelicals William
Wilberforce and Thomas Clarkson in their campaign against the slave trade, Andy
argued that Abort67 was consciously following in the footsteps of a long line of
social campaigners who had now lost their subaltern status.
Both Andy and Kathryn were acquitted. Here, then, we see the pragmatic benefit of
‘legal theology’ (Comaroff 2009), in which secular legal structures are used towards
Christian ends. Furthermore, historical comparators help cement the narrative of mar-
ginalisation that brings into being the Centre’s counterpublic status. While other read-
ings of their victory might suggest that the law, in this case at least, did work on its own
terms – that although the police had been wrong to arrest Andy and Kathryn, the courts
had rectified this injustice by finding them not guilty – the references to eighteenth-
century social reformers allied Abort67 with an historic counterpublic, casting them
as maligned but righteous crusaders who had been unfairly detained for speaking
truth – or Truth – to power. Wilberforce’s invocation both highlighted the virtue of
Andy and Kathryn’s actions and critiqued the inequity of the current legal framework,
which had appeared to oppose them. All this in spite of the fact that, in this case at least,
their rights had been upheld.
The ethnographic record shows that conservative Christian activists are not the only
members of human rights ‘cultures’ who regard rights discourse with scepticism. Tobias
Kelly (2011: 728), for example, claims that ‘[d]oubt marked the corridors and meeting
rooms of [the United Nations building in] Geneva’, while Annelise Riles (2006: 55)
writes that many of the elite academics, bureaucrats, and human rights activists
among whom she carried out research displayed ‘a profound and sophisticated scepti-
cism about various aspects of the human rights regime – its theoretical claims, its insti-
tutional practices, and its archetypal subjectivities’. And yet, this did not stop them from
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‘“doing” human rights work’ in its various guises: teaching academic courses on rights;
serving as expert witnesses; training others in human rights technologies; producing
human rights documents (Riles 2006: 56).
What is one to make of this apparent contradiction? In Riles’ analysis, human rights
is an area of legal knowledge in which the dominant understanding of the law, particu-
larly among U.S. trained lawyers and activists, is a technocratic, instrumentalist one:
‘The phrase ‘law is a means to an end’ or ‘law is an instrument’ appears hundreds of
times in the canonical texts of modern U.S. jurisprudence’ (Riles 2006: 59). Given
that they must adopt this instrumentalist approach in their day jobs as lawyers, legal
academics, and bureaucrats, her informants’ critiques of human rights ‘true believers’
are ultimately ineffective, as they are made by those whose own daily lives lead them
to see such critique as ‘leisurely nonaction, as opposed to professional, up-to-the-
minute instrumental action’ (Riles 2006: 55–61). In other words, their ‘critique of
legal tools’ was easily transformed into ‘a tool of legal critique’ (Riles 2006: 61).
Riles’ analysis suggests that it is particularly difficult to challenge the human rights
project using the tools of elite lawyers, bureaucrats, and scholars: ‘critique and irony’.
This article has asked how such a challenge might fare when mounted by a different
set of critical lawyers with very different objections to the human rights project.
Although their use of rights language might be seen ‘as an instance of unwitting accom-
modation to the cunning of secular liberal reason’ (Casanova 2006: 27), I suggest that
these test cases contribute to a meaningful critique of rights discourse by revealing the
inequity of the law as a site for public discourse. Johns, for example, upset the norms of
privacy and publicity that regulate sexuality and religion in the U.K., revealing that the
domestication and privatisation of both faith and sex – characteristics which the bour-
geois public sphere might want to see bracketed during the public use of one’s reason
(Habermas 2002 [1962]: 36; Calhoun 1992: 13) –works to bolster the exclusionary prac-
tices of public space. As with the queer and feminist counterpublics studied by Warner
(2002), Fraser (1995), and Felski (1989), which show that patriarchal heteronormativity
is perpetuated through the refusal to recognise that the personal is political, cases that
pit these ostensibly private rights against each other show them to have an inevitably
public component in which some rights claims – and, therefore, the groups who
claim those rights – can be portrayed as being ‘more equal than others’ (Williams
2011a).
As noted above, Asad (2003: 138) is undoubtedly correct to highlight the proble-
matic relationship between state norms and human rights, in which ‘an unresolved
tension [remains] between the invocation of ‘universal humanity’ and the power of pol-
itical authorities charged with maintaining the law’. In his analysis, rights become ‘float-
ing signifiers’ to be attached and detached according to the needs of powerful states and
capitalist expansion (Asad 2003: 158; cf. Brown, 2004: 457), with devastating effects on
the (often non-Western, non-Christian) people to whom state violence is eventually dis-
placed. In the words of José Casanova (2006: 28), this is a ‘stark picture of the secular,
liberal democracy, and the human rights regime, all blurred into an undifferentiated
totality of Western modernity’. But as Casanova has argued in relation to the Catholic
Church’s embrace of universal rights, and as my research supports, rights discourse
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does not only serve to legitimise the norms of the state. Rather, cases like Johns and Ste-
phenson/Sloane show a religious tradition ‘confronting’ the law, challenging it to face its
‘own obscurantist, ideological, and unauthentic claims’ (Casanova 1994: 234). These
cases destabilise understandings of modernity in which public law and private morality
are, in the context of a plural society, held separate (Casanova 2006: 27). The legal estab-
lishment’s rubbishing of Johns notwithstanding, that it was heard at all suggests that it is
the context-negation of human rights theory, and not – or at least not only – the over-
wrought language of the Christian Legal Centre that had been revealed as ‘extravagant
rhetoric’.
Conclusion
Does it matter that ‘human rights doctrine either is not or cannot be theoretically
founded’ (Freeman 1994: 500)? For those who believe human rights to have their
origins in the intellectual legacy of Christianity, it just might. Wolterstorff (2008), for
example, has argued that secularisation could result in a lessening of the moral force
of rights-based theories of justice, as the widespread adoption of a non-theological
anthropology might lead to a dereliction of the duties we owe one another as the cre-
ations of God. Contra rights critics, Wolterstorff (2008: 389) argues that inherent rights
are not individualistic or selfish per se – indeed, he understands rights, as duties owed in
relationship, to have an inbuilt sociality – but become so only through their misuse: ‘We
twist the culture of rights to our malign impulses.’ Were we to forget their divine soci-
ality, rights might indeed find themselves at risk, with ‘secular advocates of equal rights’
as foolish as ‘children who see beautiful flowers, grab them, break them at their stems,
and try to transplant them without their roots’ (Pojman 1991: 496).
For the staff of the Christian Legal Centre, there is some truth in this assessment. If
the European Convention’s recognition of human dignity is thought to flow from
Europe’s Christian heritage (however loosely defined), then the lessening of the
moral force of Christianity might result in the lessening of the moral weight of
human rights. However, this narrative is complicated by the way these ‘broken
flowers’ are understood to have been replanted in secular soil. In a reworking of Wol-
terstorff’s suggestion that a societal decrease in belief in the Biblical God might go hand
in hand with a general decrease in those who agitate for justice on the basis of inherent
rights, Andrea and her team seem to see the human rights project as representing, if not
actually enabling, Britain’s increasing rejection of what they deem to be Biblical precepts
(cf. Duranti 2017).
In this way, the Convention is simultaneously posited as the result of Europe’s some-
what ill-defined Christian heritage – an instrument ‘infused’ with Christian values – and
a sign of its departure from Biblical beliefs. The legal system’s embrace of rights shows
that Britain has entered a world in which the limited knowledge of the created is priori-
tised over and above the limitless wisdom of the Creator, where fleeting pleasures are
chosen over lasting glory. In Biblical terms, a rights-based legal system shows Britain
to have committed the ‘two evils’ of the Old Testament Book of Jeremiah: it has forsa-
ken God, ‘the fountain of living waters, and hewed out cisterns for [itself], broken
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cisterns that can hold no water’ (Jeremiah 2:13). As such, and whether an individual
case is won or lost, counterpublic language always works to supply the Centre with
further evidence of the marginal status of conservative Christians in twenty-first
century Britain, thus proving that a rights-based society fails to practice the equality
it preaches.
Yet as Wendy Brown (2004: 453) has argued of human rights more broadly, ‘[n]o
effective project produces only the consequences it aims to produce’. Ambiguity
remains. Warner (2002: 63) suggests that counterpublics are inevitably ‘damaged
forms of publicness’, distorted by virtue of their relationship of subordination to domi-
nant public discourse. The idea of a ‘damaged’ form of publicity has some purchase
here, for the problem with using rights to undermine rights is that, in the end, it is
rights talk – and not God talk – that takes centre stage. When Christian activists
respond in kind to the rights-based agenda they hope to counter, they might end up
reinforcing the structures they wish to contest. Indeed, this critique was often voiced
by members of the conservative congregation with whom I carried out fieldwork
after my time at the Christian Legal Centre, many of whom – despite sharing the
Centre’s social and theological conservativism, and despite feeling great personal sym-
pathy for (some of) the claimants – worried that contentious legal activism undermined
the relational message at the heart of the Gospel (see McIvor 2016). The Abort67 case,
for example, ensured that Andy and Kathryn’s right to ‘expose’ abortion was upheld.
But it also risked their being seen to have bought into the individualist, atomistic
culture they sought to challenge.
To return to the counterpublics of gender and sexuality mentioned above, one might
see in the Christian Legal Centre’s use of human rights language the same problems that
some feminists and queer theorists have with campaigns that seek to ‘normalise’ queer
lifeways: that by adopting the terminology and structures of already existing insti-
tutions, particularly those which are already problematic, the possibility of radically
restructuring human relationships is either lost or made ‘harder than ever to articulate’
(Warner 1999: 93). Although I have argued that Christian activists use rights claims in
an effort to undermine the fragmenting impact of a rights-based system, others might
see in them the difficulty experienced by Riles’ elite critics, who, though seeking to chal-
lenge the structures of rights discourse, ultimately reproduce it.
Notes
1. Christian Concern was founded in 2008 by Andrea Minichiello Williams, a barrister, and Pastor
Ade Omooba, an evangelical minister. It is funded by donations from supporters, who come
from a range of conservative, primarily Protestant churches. During fieldwork in 2012, the
group had approximately 35,000 supporters on its mailing list. This figure has now grown: at
the time of writing, Christian Concern’s website states that its email bulletins reach 43,000
supporters.
2. McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd [2010].
3. Chaplin v Royal Devon and Exeter NHS Foundation Trust [ET/1702886/09].
4. Given ‘Brexit’, there is some uncertainty regarding the U.K.’s commitment to the European
Convention (which many Britons erroneously associate with the EU).
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5. Article 9’s interiorised definition of religion, which guarantees freedom of belief but offers only
qualified protection to its manifestation, makes proving a violation particularly difficult (Peroni
2014; McIvor 2015).
6. In at least one case, an alternative legal strategy was actually pointed out by the presiding judge.
See Core Issues v TfL.
7. Christian Concern and the Christian Legal Centre are run from the same London office and are
largely staffed by the same people. Their primary difference relates to their areas of expertise:
while Christian Concern is concerned with political lobbying and consciousness-raising, the
Legal Centre litigates cases involving Christians who feel they have been penalised for their
faith. Given their overlaps in terms of location, personnel, and interests, I refer to them some-
what interchangeably throughout the article.
8. Fieldwork was carried out between July 2012 and April 2014 at Christian Concern/Christian
Legal Centre and a conservative evangelical congregation in the greater London area. The
most intensive period of fieldwork with Christian activists was July–December 2012, during
which time I carried out an informal internship at Christian Concern’s central London office.
9. By contrast to the foundation myth, the understanding of human dignity upon which these con-
servatives built was disturbingly compatible with ongoing anti-Semitism (Duranti, 2012: 170;
Moyn 2015: 77).
10. ‘Ex-gay’ refers to those who are seeking to ‘move away’ from what they term ‘same-sex attraction’.
11. The Emmanuel Centre is a Christian conference centre in Westminster.
12. This is neither typical nor atypical of a Christian Concern event. At this particular church, most
attendees appeared to be sixty-plus and white British (although some Coptic Christians were
also present). However, Christian Concern speakers are also invited to church youth groups,
black-majority churches, Asian-majority churches, etc. In terms of its denominational, age,
class, and ethnic make-up, their support base is extremely broad.
13. It is worth noting that ‘intellectual dishonesty’ is also the termWendy Brown (2004: 461) uses in
her critique of Michael Ignatieff’s minimalist account of rights.
14. The Johns had returned to Jamaica by the time I began my fieldwork.








23. For a fuller account of the contested reception of Christian activism by other Christians, please
see McIvor 2016.
24. Emphasis in original.
25. At [33].
26. I am grateful to a reviewer for pointing me towards Weizman’s work.
27. A number of claimants in high-profile Christian discrimination cases are migrants and/or
members of minority ethnic groups. As with feminist counterpublics (Felski 1989: 168–169),
groups that construct themselves as marginal will always include some members who are
more marginal than others.
28. Andy had been arrested under the Public Order Act in June 2011 after refusing to remove a par-
ticularly graphic banner from an Abort67 demonstration. He was also charged, along with col-
league Kathryn Sloane, with obstructing a police officer under section 19 of the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
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